Th e underdeveloped services sector in Asia has the potential to become a new engine of economic growth for developing Asia, which has traditionally relied on export-oriented manufacturing to power its growth. Th e central objective of this paper is to empirically analyze the prospects for the services sector as a future engine of growth. Our analysis of 12 Asian countries indicates that the services sector has already contributed substantially to the region's growth in the past. Furthermore, somewhat surprisingly in light of the diffi culty of achieving productivity gains in services, we also fi nd that services labor productivity grew at a healthy pace in much of the region. Overall our analysis provides substantial cause for optimism about the role of the services sector as an engine of growth in Asia. However, some Asian countries where the services sector is currently struggling, such as Korea and Th ailand, will fi nd it more challenging to develop the sector.
I INTRODUCTION
Developing Asia has been the star performer of the world economy for the past few decades. In the 1960s newly industrialized economies (NIEs) such as Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan kicked off the region's tectonic transformation from a group of typical struggling developing countries into the most dynamic component of the global economy. Th e NIEs followed the Japanese blueprint of exportoriented industrialization and were in turn followed by member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Th ailand. Th e region's two giants-China and India-were the next to emerge, powered by market-oriented economic reforms and opening up of their economies to foreign trade and investment. Yet other Asian countries such as Vietnam are now following in the footsteps of China and India. Sustained rapid growth has moved developing Asia from the sidelines of the global economy to the front and center. Th e region has outperformed not only the maturing advanced economies but also other parts of the developing world, and continues to do so. An important by-product of the region's stellar growth performance has been an unprecedented reduction in poverty.
Broadly speaking, economic growth comes from accumulation of productive factors-i.e., capital and labor-and productivity growth. It is true that productivity growth has contributed substantially to developing Asia's economic growth in the past. 1 In particular, the reallocation of surplus rural workers from low-productivity agriculture to high-productivity manufacturing boosted economywide productivity and growth. However, much of Asia's growth was also driven by factor accumulation.
Favorable demographic trends led to a rapid growth of the labor force. Heavy investments in education and fl exible labor market enabled Asia to fully take advantage of favorable demographics. In addition to rapid expansion of the labor force, high saving and investment rates allowed Asian countries to quickly accumulate physical capital. In some countries such as Malaysia and Singapore, large infl ows of foreign direct investment (FDI) further augmented the stock of physical capital. Th e consequent explosion of machines, factories, buildings, roads, and ports greatly expanded Asia's productive capacity. In short, both factor accumulation and productivity growth played major roles in the region's growth.
Going forward, a number of considerations suggest that the services sector will become a more important source of growth for Asia. 2 For one, there is a well-established positive relationship between the share of services in GDP (or employment) and GDP per capita.
3 Th e share of services is higher in richer countries than in poorer countries, and the share of services rises as a country's GDP per capita rises over time. Many Asian countries are at or approaching income levels where the share of services tends to increase. Th is fact alone implies a larger future role for the services sector in the economy and in economic growth. Furthermore, while the services sector has grown in both absolute and relative terms across Asia, a wide range of internal barriers-e.g., excessive regulation-and external barriers-e.g., barriers to imports and FDI-prevent it from fulfi lling its full potential. Th erefore, removing those barriers will allow the services sector and the economy as a whole to grow faster. On the demand side, there is a growing appetite for a wide range of services, from tourism to health care to fi nancial services, among Asia's fast-expanding middle class.
Th e global fi nancial and economic crisis of 2008-09 will add further momentum to the shift from manufacturing to services in Asia. Th e crisis originated in the advanced economies and hit those economies harder than developing countries. Furthermore, the postcrisis recovery has been visibly fi rmer in the developing countries than in the advanced economies. Th e upshot for Asia is a less benign external environment in which the advanced countries have weaker growth prospects and hence appetite for imports. Th erefore, manufacturing exports to the United States, European Union, and Japan will become a less forceful engine of growth for the region in the post-global crisis period. Aside from a less favorable global environment, more fundamental factors are at work as well. More specifi cally, manufacturing is maturing in some Asian countries and manufacturing productivity has reached high levels, which implies that the scope for manufacturing-led growth will be more limited than in the past. At the same time, it should be noted that in other countries such as India and the Philippines, there is still plenty of room for manufacturing to grow.
Its high investment rates in the past have left Asia with a large stock of physical capital. Diminishing marginal returns to capital imply that although investment will continue to make a sizeable contribution to growth, productivity growth is likely to play a relatively bigger role in the future. Given the growing weight of services and given the growing weight of productivity growth in economic growth, productivity growth of services industries will be pivotal for Asia's future growth. At a broader level, the central objective of this paper is to empirically examine the prospects for the services sector to serve as an engine of growth for Asia. Th e rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 looks at the evolution of the services sector in major Asian countries. Section 3 investigates the relationship between per capita GDP and the share of services in GDP and employment. Section 4 assesses the role of the services sector as an engine of growth by examining the contribution of services sector to overall growth, labor productivity in services relative to manufacturing, and determinants of labor productivity in services. Section 5 concludes the paper.
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II EVOLUTION OF THE SERVICES SECTOR IN ASIAN COUNTRIES OVER TIME
In this section, we look at how the services sector has evolved in 12 major Asian economies. More specifically, we look at the share of services in total output and employment. Th e 12 countries are China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Th ailand, and Vietnam. Th e data are collected from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. In advanced economies, the sectoral composition of employment tends to be as follows: Th e share of the services sector in employment is greater than the share of the manufacturing sector in employment, which, in turn, is greater than the share of the agriculture sector in employment. Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan all fi t this pattern. Th e shares of the three sectors in GDP are also in the same order except Malaysia. 4 Typically, at the beginning of the industrialization process-for example, in Korea or Malaysiathe employment share of agriculture decreases and the employment shares of both industry and services increase as industrialization proceeds. Surplus workers from rural areas migrate to cities and fi nd work in factories and shops. Subsequently the share of industry in employment starts to stagnate but the share of services in employment continuously rises as the economy moves into the postindustrial phase.
GDP shares show quite similar but slightly diff erent pattern. Th e GDP share of agriculture continuously declines. At the beginning of industrialization the GDP share of industry increases much more rapidly than the GDP share of services, and then the former starts to stagnate and the latter rises rapidly. Th e sectoral employment and GDP share movements described above are typical during the process of industrialization and deindustrialization. However, while the experiences of Asian countries generally fi t the above pattern, that is not always the case. We now take a closer look at the sectoral movements in employment and GDP for each of the 12 countries (see fi gure 1).
China. Th e employment share of agriculture has steadily decreased and the employment shares of both industry and service have increased. Th e employment share of the services sector has increased even more rapidly than the employment share of industry at the early stage of industrialization. Despite rapid industrialization, the employment share of industry (27.2 percent in 2008) has not yet reached the level Korea experienced at the peak (36 percent in 1991), and the employment share of agriculture is still largest. Hence it is likely that the industrialization process will continue for a while. However, the GDP shares tell a somewhat diff erent story. Th e industry GDP share has been largest since 1969. In recent years it is around 46 to 48 percent. By way of comparison, in Korea the industry GDP share peaked at 42.6 percent in 1991. Th e services GDP share is increasing but still lower than the industry GDP share.
Can China continue to industrialize? How far will the industry GDP share increase? How much of the 4. For Malaysia, the share of the services sector in GDP is approximately the same as the share of the manufacturing sector in GDP.
remaining work force in the agricultural sector will be absorbed by the industry sector? Or can they be mostly absorbed by the services sector? Th ese are some interesting and important questions.
Hong Kong. As one might expect from a city-state, agriculture plays no role in either employment or GDP. Th ere is a very clear trend in the share of services versus industry in both employment and GDP.
Th ere is a secular rise in services' share of both employment and GDP, and a corresponding secular fall in industry's share of both. Th e shift of labor and output from manufacturing to services mirrors the hollowing out of the territory's manufacturing base as a result of its relocation to China.
India. For India, the employment shares are reported in only two years, 2000 and 2005. From the limited data, we can still detect a tendency of the employment share of agriculture to decline, and the employment shares of both industry and services to rise. However, the employment share of agriculture is much higher than the shares of the other two sectors, refl ecting the continued importance of agriculture in the Indian economy. Th e employment share of services is a bit higher than the employment share of industry. On the other hand, the GDP share of services is much higher than that of industry. Th e GDP share of agriculture has steadily decreased since the mid-1970s. Th e GDP shares of both industry and services have increased since the mid-1970s but the GDP share of services has increased even more rapidly. Th is shows the importance of the services industry for the growth performance in India. Th e question is, can the services sector continue to be an engine of growth in India in the future?
Indonesia. Th e employment share of agriculture did not change much until the early 1990s and then it started to decline rapidly until the late 1990s. Th e employment shares of both industry and service started to increase in the early 1990s. Since the late 1990s, however, the employment share of the three sectors has remained fairly stable. On the other hand, the GDP share of industry increased most drastically before the 1980s. Th e GDP share of services increased but not as much as the GDP share of industry.
Korea. Korea shows a typical pattern of industrialization and deindustrialization. Th e GDP share of industry has not decreased much, staying around 40 percent, while its employment share has decreased continuously to 25 percent since the early 1990s. On the other hand, while the employment share of services has continuously increased, the GDP share of services has not since the early 2000s. Overall, Korea is a high-income economy in which the manufacturing sector continues to play a major role.
Malaysia
. Th e employment shares show the typical movements of ups and downs resulting from industrialization and deindustrialization. Th e employment share of industry increased from the late 1980s
and then started to decrease from the late 1990s. Th e employment share of services increased rapidly from the late 1990s. On the other hand, however, only the GDP share of industry increased rapidly while the GDP share of service decreased until the mid 1970s. Since then, though, the shares of both industry and service have increased at the same pace. Notwithstanding the relocation of many manufacturing fi rms to China, manufacturing remains an important part of the economy.
Th ailand. Th e employment share of agriculture has been continuously decreasing. Th e employment shares of both industry and services increased until the mid-1990s. Th e employment share of services has been increasing even more rapidly since then, but the employment share of industry has not changed much. Since Th ailand has a strong agricultural sector and is a major food exporter, the employment share of agriculture is still the largest. Th e employment share of services is slightly lower and the employment share of industry is much lower, at around 20 percent. On the other hand, the GDP share of services has not changed much and even decreased recently. Th e decrease in the GDP share of agriculture is mostly off set by the GDP share of industry. Th is suggests that the services sector is dragging the growth performance of Th ailand.
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Vietnam. Th e data for sectoral employment shares are available only for 2005-10 and show a very similar pattern to India. It seems that Vietnam is still in the midst of industrialization in the sense that the decrease in the GDP share of agriculture is mostly off set by the GDP share of industry. Th e GDP share of the services sector has been decreasing since the mid-1990s, which is somewhat surprising. Th e services sector remains very much underdeveloped.
Overall, the evolution of services' share in GDP and employment over time in Asian countries largely mirrors the international historical experience. Quite clearly, the services sector is playing a large and growing role in GDP and employment across the whole region. At the same time, our review of country experiences reveals a great deal of heterogeneity in the relative importance of services among
Asian countries, as highly emphasized by Ghani (2010) . To some extent such heterogeneity is rooted in the wide range of income and development levels in Asia. As explained in section 3 below, the share of services in GDP and employment tends to rise with per capita income. However, income and development levels can explain only part of the intra-Asian heterogeneity. For example, India's services sector is larger than other countries at a similar income level whereas the reverse is true for China.
Furthermore, there is also a great deal of heterogeneity with respect to the growth rate of the share of services in GDP and employment. For example, in 1980 the share of services in employment was similar in Indonesia and the Philippines but by 2010 it was noticeably higher in the Philippines. Tables 1 and 2 show the sectoral real GDP growth rates and labor productivity growth rates, respectively, in three subsample periods: period 1 (1960-80), period 2 (1980-2000) , and period 3 (2000-2010). On average, the real GDP growth rate of the services sector was lower than that of the industry sector during the fi rst two periods. But in the second period, the gap between the two narrowed sharply and they were quite comparable. In fact, by the third period, the services sector outgrew the industry sector. While it is widely argued that productivity growth in services is inherently diffi cult to achieve, table 2 shows that some countries have in fact been able to achieve substantial gains. Furthermore, the gap between the average labor productivity growth rate of the services and industry sectors narrowed sharply in period 3.
We now examine individual countries. While China is experiencing industrialization, the growth rate of GDP in the services sector is quite comparable to that in the industry sector. Table 2 suggests that the growth of the services sector, particularly in the last period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) , is mainly due to labor productivity growth. In Hong Kong, the growth of the economy is mainly due to the growth of the services sector. Th e other sectors are small and show even negative growth rates. India is rapidly growing, particularly in the last subsample period. Th e GDP growth rate of the services sector is higher than that of the industry sector. Th e labor productivity growth rate of the services sector is much higher than that of the industry sector. Figure 1 suggests that the driving engine of growth in Indonesia is the industry sector.
Interestingly, however, the GDP growth rate as well as the labor productivity growth rate of the services 8 sector is higher than those of the industry sector in the last subsample period. In Korea, the services sector real GDP growth rate is particularly low. Th e labor productivity growth rate of the services sector is even more problematic.
In Malaysia, the services sector GDP growth rate is quite comparable to that of the industry sector.
In fact, in the last subsample period, the services sector growth rate was much higher than the industry sector growth rate. Th e labor productivity growth rate of the services sector was lower in the 1980-2000 period than for industry but similar in the last subsample period. In Pakistan, while the services sector GDP growth rate has always been lower than the industry sector GDP growth rate, the two were comparable in the last two subsample periods. Th e labor productivity growth rate of the services sector was lower in the second subsample period but higher than that of the industry in the last subsample period. In the Philippines, the services sector growth rate was lower than the industry sector growth rate in the fi rst subsample period but higher in the last two subsample periods. Th e labor productivity growth rates were both negative in the second subsample period, but they were positive and comparable in the last subsample period.
In Singapore, the growth rate of the services sector was much lower than that of the industry sector in the fi rst subsample period but slightly higher in the last two subsample periods. Th e labor productivity growth rate of the services sector was comparable to that of the industry sector in the second subsample period but much lower in the last subsample period. In Taiwan, the services sector growth rate was high in the second subsample period but much lower in the last subsample period. Th e labor productivity growth rate also showed the same pattern. In Th ailand, the services sector growth rate was lower than the industry sector growth rate in all three subsample periods. Th e gap between the two was even wider for labor productivity growth. In Vietnam, the services sector growth rate was quite high in the last two subsample periods even though it was lower than the industry sector growth rate. Th e labor productivity growth rate was reported only for the last subsample period and was quite high.
One interesting feature of the services sector is that a growing range of services are increasingly tradable as a result of technological advances, especially in information and communication technology.
Th e share of services sector output that is exported is reported in table 3. In most Asian countries, there is a tendency in the share of services sector output that is exported to increase over time. Some exceptions are China (2000 -2009 ), Indonesia (2000 -2009 ), Malaysia (2000 -2009 , Pakistan (1990 Pakistan ( -2000 , the Philippines (1990 Philippines ( -2000 , Singapore (1990 Singapore ( -2000 , and Vietnam (2000 Vietnam ( -2009 
III PER CAPITA GDP AND THE SHARE OF THE SERVICES SECTOR IN GDP AND EMPLOYMENT
According to a well-known stylized fact, as per capita income increases, the shares of services in both employment and GDP rise. Th is relationship is often characterized as linear or quadratic (for example, see Kongsamut, Rebelo, and Xie 1999 and Buera and Kaboski 2009) . However, more recently, Eichengreen and Gupta (2009) argue there are two distinct waves of services sector growth. According to them, the services sector's share of output begins to rise at relatively modest incomes but at a decelerating rate as growth proceeds, which they call the fi rst wave, and then it begins to rise again in a second wave at higher income levels. Th e fi rst wave is characterized by the rise of the traditional services-lodging, meal preparation, housecleaning, beauty and barber shops-while the second wave is dominated by modern services-banking, insurance, computing, communication, and business services.
Th e two waves of services sector growth can be characterized by a quartic relationship. Following
Eichengreen and Gupta (2009) Table 4 reports two estimation results: without period dummies (column 1) and with period dummies (column 2). We include country fi xed eff ects. In both cases, all the per capita GDP terms of the fi rst to the fourth orders are highly signifi cant, confi rming the quartic relationship. When we include the two period dummies in the second column, their coeffi cients are positive and signifi cant, suggesting diff erent intercepts in diff erent subsample periods. In fact, the more recent the subsample period is, the higher is the intercept. 6. In order to save space, we provide fi gures only for periods 1 and 2.
the fi tted line, the share of services in GDP is higher than in other countries with similar per capita GDP, and the reverse is true for observations below the fi tted line. We can observe a number of distinct patterns among Asian countries, implying a high degree of heterogeneity across the region. Th e share of the services sector in GDP lies below the predicted line in both periods 1 (1970-89) and 2 (1990-2010) for China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Th e share of the services sector in GDP lies above the predicted line in both periods 1 and 2 for Hong Kong. Th e share of the services sector in GDP lies below the predicted line in period 1 but above it in period 2 for India and the Philippines. Th e share of the services sector in GDP lies above the predicted line in period 1 but below it in period 2 for Singapore and Th ailand. Pakistan's services sector lies more or less on the predicted line. In Taiwan, the services sector lies below the predicted line in period 1 but on the predicted line in period 2. Table 5 reports the same regression results except that the dependent variable is the share of the services sector in employment rather than GDP. Th e results indicate that there is also a similar quartic relationship between the share of the services sector in employment and per capita GDP. Th e above fi ndings can be used to interpret the relative performance of the services sector. For example, if the share of the services sector in a country's employment is on the predicted line, but its share of GDP lies below the predicted line, we can interpret that, compared with other countries with the same level of per capita GDP, its services sector workforce produces less GDP. Th is indicates that its services sector performs poorly. According to this line of reasoning, our fi ndings suggest that there are broadly three groups of countries. 7 Th e services sector performs better than the international norm in Hong Kong, 7. Our classifi cation is based on relative labor productivity of the services sector comparing countries with similar per capita GDP. Another possible interpretation of the graphs is that if both employment and GDP shares of the services India, and Pakistan. Th e services sector performs more or less in line with the international norm in China, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Th is is also arguably the case for Indonesia, Singapore, and Taiwan.
Finally, the services sector performs worse than the international norm in Korea and Th ailand, and arguably in Malaysia as well. As noted earlier, while the relative importance of services is high and growing across Asia, the region's services sector is marked by a great deal of heterogeneity. Such heterogeneity extends to the performance of services sector.
IV CAN THE SERVICES SECTOR BE AN ENGINE OF GROWTH FOR ASIA?
In this section, we empirically examine the prospects for the services sector to become an engine of growth for Asia. To do so, we investigate (1) contribution of agriculture, industry, and services sectors to GDP growth, (2) productivity of the services sector relative to the industry sector, and (3) determinant of services sector productivity.
Sectoral Contribution to GDP Growth
We focus on the three most recent decades: 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Th e sectoral contribution in each decade is calculated by dividing the log diff erence in the sectoral value-added by the log diff erence in the aggregate GDP. Th e fi rst three columns in each decade panel (1980s, 1990s, and 2000s) in table 6 sum up to 100 percent. Th e last column in each decade panel is the aggregate GDP growth rate in each decade.
Overall, the services sector makes the biggest contribution to GDP growth. In the 1980s, the services sector made the biggest contribution to growth in the Philippines (81.7 percent), Singapore In general, the services sector's contribution tends to be larger for more advanced economies. As the economy grows, the services sector becomes larger and hence the overall growth depends more on the performance of the services sector. In this sense, the performance of Korea's services sector is noticeably weak relative to its per capita GDP. On the other hand, the performance of the services sector in India and Pakistan is noticeably strong relative to their per capita GDP.
sector lie below the predicted line, the smaller size itself is also an indication of less development. However, since the size of the services sector depends on a number of country-specifi c characteristics such as natural resource endowment, it may be misleading to solely rely on size without controlling for such characteristics.
Labor Productivity in the Services versus Industry Sector
In the literature, a number of arguments have been made for why labor productivity growth is low in the services sector: 8 (1) Services are intensive in labor rather than capital, making it diffi cult to achieve innovation, which is embodied in capital; (2) services sector fi rms are too small to devote adequate resources to research and development or to risk new production techniques; (3) international competition is weak because most services are nontradable; and (4) a lot of employment in services refl ects underemployment of individuals who cannot fi nd jobs in other places. Hence it has been long argued that as economies become more services oriented, growth slows down. As the manufacturing sector matures and resources are reallocated to the services sector, achieving productivity growth and hence economic growth becomes more challenging. Th is line of reasoning underlies the widely held notion that services cannot be a driver of growth for developing economies. However, we saw earlier that in a number of Asian countries, labor productivity growth rate of the services sector is quite high. Table 7 shows that the labor productivity of both manufacturing and services sectors increases as per capita GDP increases. Columns I to III are pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation results of regressing the labor productivity of manufacturing and services sectors and their relative labor productivity on per capita GDP. Th e coeffi cient of the log per capita GDP is slightly higher when the dependent variable is the log labor productivity of the services sector (column I) rather than the log labor productivity of the industry sector (column II). Figures 4a and 4b show the actual log labor productivity of the services sector and the industry sector, respectively, as well as the estimated trends. When we regress the labor productivity of the services sector relative to that of the industry sector on per capita GDP, the coeffi cient is positive and signifi cant (column III). Th e results seem to suggest that labor productivity in services grows faster than that in industry, which is counterintuitive.
However, the above OLS estimation has limitations. In particular, other control variables are not included in the regression. In columns IV to VI, we report the results of panel estimation with fi xed eff ects. Panel estimation with fi xed eff ects eliminates unobserved but time-invariant country-specifi c variables and hence focuses on the time series variations within countries. Now the results are reversed.
Th e coeffi cient of the log per capita GDP is much lower when the dependent variable is the log labor productivity of the services sector rather than the log labor productivity of the industry sector (columns IV and V). Th e coeffi cient is also negative and signifi cant when the dependent variable is the relative productivity of the services sector (column VI). Hence the panel estimation results indicate that in general labor productivity grows more slowly in the services sector than in the industry sector.
8. See, for example, Eichengreen, Perkins, and Shin (2012) and other studies cited therein.
Determinants of Services Sector Productivity
Th ese fi ndings suggest that the labor productivity in the services sector is not entirely determined by the per capita GDP. In this section, we empirically examine the more general determinants of labor productivity in the services sector based on the equation typically adopted in the empirical growth literature.
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We divide the sample into fi ve-year periods: 1975-80, 1980-85, 1985-90, 1990-95, 1995-2000, 2000-2005, and 2005-10 . We calculate the growth rate of fi ve-year average labor productivity in the services sector. We then regress the growth rate of fi ve-year average labor productivity on explanatory variables at the initial year of each period. We use the initial-year explanatory variables to avoid endogeneity problems. Th e specifi cation of the empirical model is as follows:
: the growth rate of fi ve-year average labor productivity for country i from t to t+5
Y it : log per capita income for country i at t Th e explanatory variables are the same as those used by Eichengreen and Gupta (2009) . 10 While they used the share of the services sector in GDP as the dependent variable, we use labor productivity growth in the services sector as the dependent variable. We use the institutionalized democracy score from the Polity IV data series; distance, from CEPII; nontropical area and latitude, from Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999) ; governance indicators from the World Bank; and aggregate governance indicators 9. A number of empirical studies investigate the determinants of growth. See, for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003) and other studies cited therein.
10. We do not include one explanatory variable, governance, that is used in Eichengreen and Gupta (2009) Table 8 reports the results. We report panel estimation with random eff ects (column I) and panel estimation with fi xed eff ects (column II). In column II, the coeffi cients of the proximity (log diff erence from UK or US) and nontropical area (land outside the tropics) and latitude are not reported because those variables are not time-varying.
We now interpret the results of the random eff ects estimation (column I). Th e coeffi cient of the initial per capita GDP is negative and highly signifi cant. Th is means that the lower the initial level of per capita GDP, the higher is the subsequent growth rate of labor productivity in the services sector. Th is result is consistent with other studies found in the empirical growth literature where the explanatory variable is typically the growth rate of output instead of the labor productivity. Th e coeffi cient of total trade as percentage of GDP is negative and signifi cant at 10 percent. Th is looks implausible but a possible explanation is as follows: In general, industry products are more tradable than services and hence trade is more benefi cial for the industry sector than the services sector. In contrast the coeffi cient of services trade as a percentage of GDP is positive and signifi cant at 1 percent. Th is implies that trade in services only contributes to the growth of labor productivity in the services sector. 11 Th is is plausible since import of services exposes domestic services fi rms to foreign competition and forces them to become more effi cient.
Likewise, exporting services requires services fi rms to be able to compete in foreign services markets.
Th e coeffi cient of urban population is also positive and signifi cant at 5 percent, whereas the coeffi cient of aged dependency is negative and signifi cant at 1 percent. Th e other coeffi cients are not signifi cant.
Th e results of the fi xed eff ects estimation (column II) are very consistent with the results of the random eff ects model. Th e only exception is that the coeffi cient of urban population becomes insignifi cant. But it is still positive and its t-value is pretty high (1.38). Th e consistency between the results of the random eff ects and fi xed eff ects models gives us some confi dence about the robustness of our empirical fi ndings.
V CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Th e central objective of this paper was to empirically examine the prospects for the services sector to act as an engine of growth in Asia. While there are diff erences across the 12 Asian countries, their overall experiences are consistent with well-established international historical patterns of sectoral shares of GDP 11. Francois (1990) demonstrated that liberalizing trade in services yields effi ciency gains for both importing and exporting countries due to increased division of labor.
and employment. As a country industrializes, the shares of industry and services sectors in both GDP and employment rise whereas the share of agriculture falls. As the country deindustrializes and moves into the postindustrial phase, the share of services rises while the shares of both industry and agriculture fall. Interestingly and signifi cantly, we fi nd that a number of Asian countries have been able to achieve substantial labor productivity gains in the services sector, which contradicts the conventional wisdom of labor productivity growth being diffi cult to achieve in services. Combined with signifi cant real output growth in the services sector comparable to that of the industry sector, this suggests that services has already been a major source of growth in Asia. Another promising sign is that the share of services-sector output that is exported tends to rise over time in most Asian countries.
Our analysis of the well-known relationship between per capita GDP and the share of services in GDP/employment indicates that some countries' services sector share is higher than that predicted by their per capita GDP while it is lower in other countries. However, the broader, more fundamental trend is an increase in the share of services as income rises. When we computed the contribution of agriculture, industry, and services to GDP growth, we fi nd that in general the services sector made the biggest contribution. One highly signifi cant fi nding is that the lower the per capita GDP, the greater the scope for labor productivity growth in the services sector. Since the income level of much of Asia remains relatively low notwithstanding the region's rapid growth, this implies that there is still a lot of room for services productivity growth. An equally signifi cant result is that services trade seems to have a signifi cant and positive eff ect on services productivity growth. We also fi nd that the share of services sector output that is exported has been increasing over time and that it is higher than South American countries and developed countries.
Overall, our evidence suggests that the services sector has already contributed substantially to Asia's productivity and GDP growth in the past. Since the fast-growing region is rapidly becoming richer and services tend to become more important as income level rises, services are set to play an even bigger role in the future. Th e popular perception of Asia's services sector lagging its manufacturing sector-i.e., worldclass manufacturing and third-class services-is further cause for optimism about the future prospects of the services sector. Th at is, if even a relatively underdeveloped services sector contributes signifi cantly to growth, then clearly a more developed services sector can contribute even more. More fundamentally, a wide range of internal impediments-e.g., excessive regulation and state monopolies-and external impediments-e.g., barriers to services trade and FDI-shackle Asia's services sector. Removing those obstacles will unleash the full potential of Asia's services sector to generate jobs and growth. In fact, some
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